Another big question mark no-one's yet addressed, though- IOTL, the Taiwanese independence movement's effectively given up all claims to the mainland, and to be the sole legitimate government of all of China. ITTL though, mightn't the KMT regime's successful development and deployment of nuclear weaponry, before they can be stopped from doing so by the USA as they were IOTL, effectively see them more closely paralleling OTL's North Korea, or Pakistan?
The easiest way to prevent Chang Hsien-yi, Deputy Director of INER, from defecting to the USA in December 1987, or at any time in the next two years that it'd take Taiwan to successfully develop its own nuclear deterrent, would be if the presidential order promulgated by President Chiang Ching-kuo on 15 July 1987, which finally lifted Martial Law in the Taiwan Area, were simply never issued in the first place. Perhaps if the attempted cover-up of the 'Donggang Incident' were actually successful ITTL, and thus the United States House of Representatives never passed the "Taiwan Democracy Resolution" (H.R.1777) on 17 June 1987, nor the US Senate in December (immediately prior to Col Chang's defection)?
Thus, a Taiwan which does maintain martial law to a sufficient extent, for long enough, to complete its nuclear program before the Reagan Administration can manage to find out and intervene to get its program shut down, would almost certainly be a far less liberal and democratic Taiwan than IOTL. In order to bring about the outcome of a nuclear-armed Taiwan by 1989, the 'Palace Faction' of the KMT, led by Chiang Kai-shek's widow, Soong Mei-ling, would have needed to emerge victorious over 'Mr. Democracy', Lee Teng-hui. According to Chang Hsien-yi, it had been Soong Mei-ling, and the military officials loyal to her, who'd expedited the development of nuclear weapons in the first place, and had even set up a parallel chain of command to further their agenda.
A nuclear-capable Taiwan almost certainly wouldn't have renounced its claims to mainland China, any more than North Korea has. It'd also almost certainly adopt an asymmetric escalation posture, which'd almost certainly increase tensions with the PR of China in much the same manner that Pakistan's did with India. And there's a greatly increased risk that, as in the cases of Pakistan and North Korea, the massively increased strength and political power of more conservatist military elements in a nuclear-armed Taiwan could well result in TTL's Taiwan going on a downwards spiral when it comes to societal and economic progress, reducing it to become just as much of a 'basket case'.
The easiest way to prevent Chang Hsien-yi, Deputy Director of INER, from defecting to the USA in December 1987, or at any time in the next two years that it'd take Taiwan to successfully develop its own nuclear deterrent, would be if the presidential order promulgated by President Chiang Ching-kuo on 15 July 1987, which finally lifted Martial Law in the Taiwan Area, were simply never issued in the first place. Perhaps if the attempted cover-up of the 'Donggang Incident' were actually successful ITTL, and thus the United States House of Representatives never passed the "Taiwan Democracy Resolution" (H.R.1777) on 17 June 1987, nor the US Senate in December (immediately prior to Col Chang's defection)?
Thus, a Taiwan which does maintain martial law to a sufficient extent, for long enough, to complete its nuclear program before the Reagan Administration can manage to find out and intervene to get its program shut down, would almost certainly be a far less liberal and democratic Taiwan than IOTL. In order to bring about the outcome of a nuclear-armed Taiwan by 1989, the 'Palace Faction' of the KMT, led by Chiang Kai-shek's widow, Soong Mei-ling, would have needed to emerge victorious over 'Mr. Democracy', Lee Teng-hui. According to Chang Hsien-yi, it had been Soong Mei-ling, and the military officials loyal to her, who'd expedited the development of nuclear weapons in the first place, and had even set up a parallel chain of command to further their agenda.
A nuclear-capable Taiwan almost certainly wouldn't have renounced its claims to mainland China, any more than North Korea has. It'd also almost certainly adopt an asymmetric escalation posture, which'd almost certainly increase tensions with the PR of China in much the same manner that Pakistan's did with India. And there's a greatly increased risk that, as in the cases of Pakistan and North Korea, the massively increased strength and political power of more conservatist military elements in a nuclear-armed Taiwan could well result in TTL's Taiwan going on a downwards spiral when it comes to societal and economic progress, reducing it to become just as much of a 'basket case'.