Spain in the Axis: what next?

[Charles EP M.]

There was a real fear in the portuguese government of the time that Spain would invade Portugal, especially if it joined the Axis.

Aha. In that case, I'm sold: Spain joins the Axis, Portugal's joining the Allies and war comics get a whole extra front to set strips in.

 

[Artaxerxes]

Aha. In that case, I'm sold: Spain joins the Axis, Portugal's joining the Allies and war comics get a whole extra front to set strips in.

[Call of Duty XXXVI is still set in Normandy]

 

[lerk]

In a Portugal joins allies scenario, what becomes of Salazar's legacy? IOTL he is seen in a similar vein in Franco, which doesn't really mean that he has a good reputation. But if Salazar does join the war on the side of the allies I can imagine him becoming an important figure for the radical non-Nazi right (Pat Buchanan, Joseph Sobran etc.). I can imagine he might be seen as similarly to Stalin ITTL but without a Cold War against Communism and with Salazar doing a lot less than Stalin he might be seen as actually better than him. Of course eventually people would have to grapple with who he really was - but overall his reputation would most likely improve and the radical right wouldn't see as much of a beating as they did after World War II.

 

[Mumby]

Thing I see is that if Franco does join the Axis, its entirely plausible for him to flip - and I think the WAllies might even be quite keen on it. Especially the Americans.

Getting Spain to flip opens up a second front in Europe without having to fire a shot - comparable to Operation Torch and the co-option of Vichy figures like Darlan to secure Algeria. But also, it makes the Americans' preferred objective in France all that more likely - the defection of the Vichy regime to the Allies

I know that sounds whack but there was a lot of people in Vichy who believed they were just biding their time before they could turnaround and stab Germany in the back.

That obviously has massive consequences post-war. An American backed contingent of right-wing authoritarian regimes in Western Europe for one.

I think this scenario also changes the dynamic in Western Europe post war in more ways than the obvious. For one, any Continuity-Vichy regime relies upon the support of the Americans far more than OTL's France with de Gaulle as figurehead of the Resistance. Not only during the war, with the Americans undermining Churchills support of de Gaulle, but just in terms of needing support to keep themselves propped up. Also that undermining of Britain during the war gets underscored by a Labour victory and all of a sudden the UK is dramatically out of step with her neighbours.

 

[History Learner]

OP specifies the Hendaye Talks of October 1940, at that point the Germans have no commitments to North Africa and Barbarossa is not for many months. There's also the domino effect that needs to be accounted for, in that if Gibraltar falls that means Malta is vastly more likely to do so which improves the Axis position in North Africa as well as in the Balkans/USSR.

I'm increasingly convinced this makes the scenario a War Winning set up for the Axis. Operation Felix, which was the German plan against Gibraltar, envisioned it being launched in January of 1941, which would likely be when Spain enters the war formally as well to give time for preparation. I'd say the Rock falls in February, after a two month siege as the water supplies are exhausted and the garrison is marched off into captivity. This closes the entrance to the Med, and thus makes Malta untenable to be held. An aerial campaign against it in the Spring and early Summer of 1941 would seal the deal, I would see it too falling by the Summer.

That puts the British in an extremely hard place, as Axis logistics into North Africa are greatly improved to the extent I can see Alexandria being gravely imperiled by late 1941. That made preclude Churchill's gambit with Greece, which derails the Balkans Campaign entirely and sets the conditions for a successful Barbarossa for Germany. Once that is achieved, it's all over but the shouting.

 

[Death's Companion]

I'm increasingly convinced this makes the scenario a War Winning set up for the Axis. Operation Felix, which was the German plan against Gibraltar, envisioned it being launched in January of 1941, which would likely be when Spain enters the war formally as well to give time for preparation. I'd say the Rock falls in February, after a two month siege as the water supplies are exhausted and the garrison is marched off into captivity. This closes the entrance to the Med, and thus makes Malta untenable to be held. An aerial campaign against it in the Spring and early Summer of 1941 would seal the deal, I would see it too falling by the Summer.

That puts the British in an extremely hard place, as Axis logistics into North Africa are greatly improved to the extent I can see Alexandria being gravely imperiled by late 1941. That made preclude Churchill's gambit with Greece, which derails the Balkans Campaign entirely and sets the conditions for a successful Barbarossa for Germany. Once that is achieved, it's all over but the shouting.

...

That is a lot of sweeping assumptions.

For a start Barbarossa was not particularly influenced by the Balkans campaign OTL as it was already being postponed due to weather conditions, if the British do not get involved in the Balkans they have veteran divisions in North Africa to continue kicking the Italians asses. They probably do not wrap up the front before the panicking Italians send massive reinforcements (if those can be spared from planned operations against Malta and Gibraltar) and ask the Germans for assistance but they would be in a better position than OTL and the Axis would have a much harder time of it.

Barbarossa broke down due to being hopelessly over optimistic logistically and a massive underestimation of the Red Army's reserves and industrial capacity which are not affected one way or the other by events in the Med and before Lend Lease is brought up, that became crucially important in 1942-3 for the Red Army's major offensives and logistical capabilities, the danger period for the USSR losing had long passed. It just allowed them the flexibility needed to launch their more devastating blows and recover quicker than the Germans could from the undertaking, they'd go slower perhaps in a best case where Lend Lease is lessened, they'd not be stopped. Meanwhile the Germans will be devoting a lot of their air assets to the Med ITTL and airpower was utterly essential to all their operations in the East and as it started to falter things went to shit repeatedly. If those assets are being used up in a Med strategy then the Soviets are going to have an easier time.


For another the British are going to throw everything they have into the defense of Egypt and Axis logistics in North Africa were poor because of crap roads and lack of ports. They lost a large amount of tonnage sunk but what they received they could not move forwards, (Pre Operation Torch something like 90% of their supplies reached North Africa) so they'd take less losses but not be better placed to advance so its probably a stalemate around the Egyptian border, more favorable to the Axis than OTL but hardly war winning. They'd also have the economic strain of needing to support Franco.

The real question is what happens with Operation Torch, do the Allies still chance it with Gibraltar in enemy hands? Is retaking Gibraltar the objective? Is it instead campaign against Spanish Morocco as a precursor to clearing out Gibraltar? Given the Americans OTL wanted to invade France in 1943 I don't see the increased risks putting them off a 1942 amphibious invasion, something would happen though the question becomes where. Serious diplomatic efforts would probably be made to get Portugal to join them, whether those work I have my doubts but if the Spanish lose Morocco I can see it happening. Either way Franco almost certainly starts feeling for a separate peace as soon as things start going South, whether that happens or the Germans coup him or the Allies insist on demands he can't submit to is an open question.


The real butterflies come if Iberia becomes the third front will be pretty major.

Sicily is not invaded in 1943 ITTL in all liklihood, Italy stays in the war for longer if it folds early at all. The Germans also likely have hundreds of thousands of more troops not lost in Tunisia, that would be a big influence.

Spain is even worse off than Italy for large scale armoured warfare so the Allies probably end up in a grinding infantry slog there, that could either be a real drain on resources but possibly also teaches them valuable lessons that makes the late war period go smoother.

When they invade France becomes questionable as well, its possible 1944 as OTL more or less because by then other factors have aligned regardless to previous events, 1945 at the outside though but that depends on what is happening on the Eastern front. A more difficult Soviet Campaign might mean that Kursk or its annologue goes better for the Germans or Bagration does not happen though those are far from guaranteed.

Could be the war lasts into 1946 or so but by that point you've got economic collapse, nukes, various political shenanigans. That however is really assuming a lot of things go worse for the Allies which is a big stretch, there are easily a lot of interpretations where the Axis burn through a lot of irreplaceable assets earlier ITTL or do worse in key engagements due to diverted resources.

 

[History Learner]

That is a lot of sweeping assumptions.

For a start Barbarossa was not particularly influenced by the Balkans campaign OTL as it was already being postponed due to weather conditions, if the British do not get involved in the Balkans they have veteran divisions in North Africa to continue kicking the Italians asses. They probably do not wrap up the front before the panicking Italians send massive reinforcements (if those can be spared from planned operations against Malta and Gibraltar) and ask the Germans for assistance but they would be in a better position than OTL and the Axis would have a much harder time of it.

The Balkans was decisive in the set up for Barbarossa, the weather was an excuse that only emerged Post-War to explain the situation by Halder and others. Hitler's Balkan Campaign and the Invasion of the USSR by Andrew L. Zapantis found the original weather data, which revealed normal conditions and actually below average flooding. This is reinforced by review of Halder's diary, with the weather never mentioned once as an issue in but equipment losses in the Balkans and such are repeatedly. Even if you take the orthodox view on the weather situation, most sources agree the flood waters had receded by June 10th, leaving an almost two week gap there as well.

However, the start date is not what I'm quibbling over.

Martin Van Creveld's book Hitler's Strategy 1940-1941: the Balkan Clue argues that Operation Lustre (the British intervention into the Balkans) engendered Hitler's decision in March to cancel the planned two-pronged attack by AGS into Ukraine then under planning. Hitler could see the same strategic value in Crete and Greece as the British could, and this provoked grave concern among the Germans that the British could threaten their Southern flank. As a result, 12th Army was diverted to the Balkans for an expanded operation against Greece and, as fate would have it, Yugoslavia. This left the less capable and prepared 11th Army to take their place, with no pincer taking place. Instead, a broad front advance was undertaken which ultimately failed to achieve the encirclements seen elsewhere in Operation Barbarossa and gave AGS a staggered start.

Had there been no Operation Lustre, AGS would've kept 12th Army and achieved a major encirclement in the opening days of Barbarossa whereby 6th, 12th and 26th Armies of the Soviet Southwestern Front would've destroyed. This would've left a gaping hole and seriously impeded Soviet defensive operations on this front, but also would have serious ramifications elsewhere; because of the situation of OTL, the Soviets were able to transfer forces from this sector to face Army Group Center. These were the 16th and 19th Armies, and they played a very serious role in extending out combat operations around Smolensk, inflicting serious attrition on Army Group Center. Here, because of the loss of the three border armies in the opening days, there is no possibility of this occurring due to the serious pressure the Soviets will be under.

The end result of this would thus be no Kiev diversion and Smolensk ending some weeks ahead of schedule, with Army Group Center in better shape than OTL. Operations to secure out the flanks in the North (Velikiye Luki) and South (Central Front) can be conducted handily, which by middle to late August enables AGC to begin a much earlier advance on Moscow as the railways become available. It is highly likely that both Kiev and Leningrad will fall in August or perhaps early September in the case of the latter, while Moscow will follow suit by mid September. By the time of the first snows, AGS can also secure Rostov and the Donets Basin as a whole, while AGN can link up with the Finns around the Svir River. This is fatal for the USSR, and will enable the Germans to complete their victory in 1942 by achieving the Archangelsk-Astrakhan Line, then moving onto the Urals sometime in 1943 or 1944. With the USSR out, the Anglo-Americans will seek an armistice, effectively ending WWII in Europe and setting the stage for a Nazi-American Cold War.

Barbarossa broke down due to being hopelessly over optimistic logistically and a massive underestimation of the Red Army's reserves and industrial capacity which are not affected one way or the other by events in the Med and before Lend Lease is brought up, that became crucially important in 1942-3 for the Red Army's major offensives and logistical capabilities, the danger period for the USSR losing had long passed. It just allowed them the flexibility needed to launch their more devastating blows and recover quicker than the Germans could from the undertaking, they'd go slower perhaps in a best case where Lend Lease is lessened, they'd not be stopped. Meanwhile the Germans will be devoting a lot of their air assets to the Med ITTL and airpower was utterly essential to all their operations in the East and as it started to falter things went to shit repeatedly. If those assets are being used up in a Med strategy then the Soviets are going to have an easier time.

Most of this is outdated, in particular with the alleged underestimation of the Red Army; Enduring the Whirlwind: The German Army and the Russo-German War 1941-1943 by Gregory Liedtke found the German casualty projections were almost spot on until December of 1941. If they were expecting a quick victory and for the Red Army to roll over, it wasn't to be found in their internal planning. Most of what went wrong with Barbarossa was bad operational decisions, not institutional factors with the one thing outside of German control being Operation Lustre and its resulting impact on Hitler's strategic thinking.

Same goes for the impact on operations in the Mediterranean and the overall impact of Lend Lease, as well as the idea the danger period had passed by 1942-1943. Case in point:

The Red Army is often portrayed as overwhelmingly powerful in 1942; for quantitative reasons as much as anything else. In reality it was numerically far weaker than it had been in June of 1941. For instance, in spite of concentrating production on key weapons systems like tanks, aircraft and artillery and mortars the Red Army's stocks hadn't come anywhere close to pre-war levels. In June of 1941 the Red Army had 22,600 tanks on its books. In May of 1942 this total had fallen to 9,325 such machines. Aircraft had dropped from 20,000 to 14,967. Artillery and mortar stocks were down from 112,800 to 107,795 on the eve of the 1942 German summer campaign. Moreover, the increased focus on tank, artillery, and aircraft production that had even enabled the Red Army to maintain such those numbers came at the expense of other very important items - not least of which being truck production.​

​

Why then, did the Germans not achieve decisive success in 1942 and how does this relate to your point about the Med and other theaters? Because it was all inter-connected; the successful Soviet defense was only possible in the context of the Germans also being tied down by the Anglo-Americans. To quote from Western Aid for the Soviet Union During World War II: Part II by Denis Havlat:

Overall, the Western Allies were responsible only for a small fraction of the losses sustained by German infantry and armor between 1941 and 1943 (around 10 percent); however, their contribution in the destruction and occupation of the Luftwaffe was overwhelming. The same applies to their contribution in forcing the Germans to leave most heavy artillery in the Reich as anti-aircraft weapons, preventing them from being used as anti-tank weapons in the East. Without Allied military intervention, the Germans could have sent at least 2,000 additional tanks, some 5,000 additional 88 mm anti-aircraft guns, around 15,000 additional aircraft, tens of thousands of additional motor vehicles, and up to half a million additional soldiers to the Eastern Front in the years 1941–1943, which would have shifted the balance in their favor.

Further on:

Without the need to fight in the Atlantic; to transport large amounts of troops, equipment, and supplies across the entire continent; and the necessity to defend against Allied bombing, Germany could have massively reduced its U-boat, locomotive, and anti-aircraft gun and ammunition production and converted at least part of these capacities into the production of more aircraft and equipment for land warfare. Additionally, without bombing, and the need to maintain a large enough army to fight on several fronts, there would have been less need to use forced labor in the factories, thus boosting production. Historically, Germany already outproduced the USSR in certain areas like locomotives, trucks, and even bombers, with 12,664 produced by Germany in the years 1941–1943 as compared to 11,359 built by the USSR.170 Without Allied intervention and Lend-Lease, Soviet margins in these areas would most likely have widened, while margins in areas such as tanks would have shrunk significantly. If Germany and its industry could have concentrated on one single front from 1941 onwards, it most likely would have vastly changed the outcome of the war in the East.

And, finally, Lend Lease was decisive. Without it, the USSR would've went under without question. From The USSR and Total War: Why Didn’t the Soviet Economy Collapse in 1942? by Mark Harrison:

Roosevelt also contributed to Soviet stabilization. The first installment of wartime Allied aid that reached the Soviet Union in 1942, although small by later standards, amounted to some 5 per cent of Soviet GNP in that year. Although Allied aid was used directly to supply the armed forces with both durable goods and consumables, indirectly it probably released resources to households. By improving the balance of overall resources it brought about a ceteris paribus increase in the payoff to patriotic citizens. In other words, Lend-Lease was stabilizing. We cannot measure the distance of the Soviet economy from the point of collapse in 1942, but it seems beyond doubt that collapse was near. Without Lend-Lease it would have been nearer. Stalin himself recognized this, although he expressed himself more directly. He told Khrushchev several times that the Soviet Union had suffered such heavy losses that without Allied aid it would have lost the war.19

Boris V. Sokolov (2007). The role of lend‐lease in Soviet military efforts, 1941–1945, The Journal of Slavic Military Studies: Vol. 7, issue 3, pages 567-586.

In general, we can conclude that without Western supplies, the Soviet Union not only could not have won the Great Patriotic War, but was not even able to resist the German invasion, not being able to produce a sufficient amount of weapons and military equipment and provide it with fuel and ammunition. This dependence was well understood by the Soviet leadership at the beginning of the war. For example, the special envoy of President F.D. Roosevelt, G. Hopkins, reported in a message dated July 31, 1941, that Stalin believed it was impossible without American assistance from Great Britain and the USSR to resist the material might of Germany, which had the resources of occupied Europe. {70} Roosevelt, back in October 1940, announcing his decision to allow the military department to provide weapons and equipment that are surplus for the needs of the American armed forces, as well as strategic materials and industrial equipment to those countries that could protect American national interests, allowed the inclusion of these countries and Russia. {71} Without such an attitude on the part of the president, the pre-war placement in the United States of Soviet orders for equipment important for the production of weapons and military equipment would hardly have been possible.

For another the British are going to throw everything they have into the defense of Egypt and Axis logistics in North Africa were poor because of crap roads and lack of ports. They lost a large amount of tonnage sunk but what they received they could not move forwards, (Pre Operation Torch something like 90% of their supplies reached North Africa) so they'd take less losses but not be better placed to advance so its probably a stalemate around the Egyptian border, more favorable to the Axis than OTL but hardly war winning.

Throwing everything into the defense of Egypt means the Axis get easy victories at Gibraltar and Malta, as well as means the Balkans disruption never arises which has grave complications as I've previously noted. The fall of Malta in particular, however, has a serious impact on the North Africa front:

Military supplies received by Axis in North African ports, quarterly:

1941/3: 203,400 tons
1941/4: 102,100 tons
1942/1: 156,000 tons
1942/2: 248,700 tons, of which 142,000 just in April
1942/3: 200,700 tons

Total: 910,900 tons, against a theoretical 2,130,000 if always at April 1942 capacity

The source is The Crusader Project.

The reason for the large jump in April of 1942 is because that was the height of Luftwaffe's suppression of Malta, which enabled the Axis to run more convoys without the need for heavy escort along with more direct routes. With Malta in Axis hands, this is the situation from Mid-1941 onward, which means an effective doubling of supply capacity in North Africa.

They'd also have the economic strain of needing to support Franco.

I don't foresee that being an issue because the main constraint on Spain is fuel and that is partially alleviated by the fact Franco will be mostly fighting a defensive war, in that he's guarding the Straits, his own coastline and colonies and keeping Salazar in line. By the time the Anglo-Americans can be in a position to threaten him, the USSR will be going under which gives the Germans a much greater ability to assist Madrid. Even better, Spain in the Axis means Berlin gets all of the tungsten from Iberia and at a much cheaper rate than OTL.

 

[Death's Companion]

The Balkans was decisive in the set up for Barbarossa, the weather was an excuse that only emerged Post-War to explain the situation by Halder and others. Hitler's Balkan Campaign and the Invasion of the USSR by Andrew L. Zapantis found the original weather data, which revealed normal conditions and actually below average flooding. This is reinforced by review of Halder's diary, with the weather never mentioned once as an issue in but equipment losses in the Balkans and such are repeatedly. Even if you take the orthodox view on the weather situation, most sources agree the flood waters had receded by June 10th, leaving an almost two week gap there as well.

However, the start date is not what I'm quibbling over.

Martin Van Creveld's book Hitler's Strategy 1940-1941: the Balkan Clue argues that Operation Lustre (the British intervention into the Balkans) engendered Hitler's decision in March to cancel the planned two-pronged attack by AGS into Ukraine then under planning. Hitler could see the same strategic value in Crete and Greece as the British could, and this provoked grave concern among the Germans that the British could threaten their Southern flank. As a result, 12th Army was diverted to the Balkans for an expanded operation against Greece and, as fate would have it, Yugoslavia. This left the less capable and prepared 11th Army to take their place, with no pincer taking place. Instead, a broad front advance was undertaken which ultimately failed to achieve the encirclements seen elsewhere in Operation Barbarossa and gave AGS a staggered start.

Had there been no Operation Lustre, AGS would've kept 12th Army and achieved a major encirclement in the opening days of Barbarossa whereby 6th, 12th and 26th Armies of the Soviet Southwestern Front would've destroyed. This would've left a gaping hole and seriously impeded Soviet defensive operations on this front, but also would have serious ramifications elsewhere; because of the situation of OTL, the Soviets were able to transfer forces from this sector to face Army Group Center. These were the 16th and 19th Armies, and they played a very serious role in extending out combat operations around Smolensk, inflicting serious attrition on Army Group Center. Here, because of the loss of the three border armies in the opening days, there is no possibility of this occurring due to the serious pressure the Soviets will be under.

The end result of this would thus be no Kiev diversion and Smolensk ending some weeks ahead of schedule, with Army Group Center in better shape than OTL. Operations to secure out the flanks in the North (Velikiye Luki) and South (Central Front) can be conducted handily, which by middle to late August enables AGC to begin a much earlier advance on Moscow as the railways become available. It is highly likely that both Kiev and Leningrad will fall in August or perhaps early September in the case of the latter, while Moscow will follow suit by mid September. By the time of the first snows, AGS can also secure Rostov and the Donets Basin as a whole, while AGN can link up with the Finns around the Svir River. This is fatal for the USSR, and will enable the Germans to complete their victory in 1942 by achieving the Archangelsk-Astrakhan Line, then moving onto the Urals sometime in 1943 or 1944. With the USSR out, the Anglo-Americans will seek an armistice, effectively ending WWII in Europe and setting the stage for a Nazi-American Cold War.



Most of this is outdated, in particular with the alleged underestimation of the Red Army; Enduring the Whirlwind: The German Army and the Russo-German War 1941-1943 by Gregory Liedtke found the German casualty projections were almost spot on until December of 1941. If they were expecting a quick victory and for the Red Army to roll over, it wasn't to be found in their internal planning. Most of what went wrong with Barbarossa was bad operational decisions, not institutional factors with the one thing outside of German control being Operation Lustre and its resulting impact on Hitler's strategic thinking.

Same goes for the impact on operations in the Mediterranean and the overall impact of Lend Lease, as well as the idea the danger period had passed by 1942-1943. Case in point:

The Red Army is often portrayed as overwhelmingly powerful in 1942; for quantitative reasons as much as anything else. In reality it was numerically far weaker than it had been in June of 1941. For instance, in spite of concentrating production on key weapons systems like tanks, aircraft and artillery and mortars the Red Army's stocks hadn't come anywhere close to pre-war levels. In June of 1941 the Red Army had 22,600 tanks on its books. In May of 1942 this total had fallen to 9,325 such machines. Aircraft had dropped from 20,000 to 14,967. Artillery and mortar stocks were down from 112,800 to 107,795 on the eve of the 1942 German summer campaign. Moreover, the increased focus on tank, artillery, and aircraft production that had even enabled the Red Army to maintain such those numbers came at the expense of other very important items - not least of which being truck production.​

​

Why then, did the Germans not achieve decisive success in 1942 and how does this relate to your point about the Med and other theaters? Because it was all inter-connected; the successful Soviet defense was only possible in the context of the Germans also being tied down by the Anglo-Americans. To quote from Western Aid for the Soviet Union During World War II: Part II by Denis Havlat:


Further on:

And, finally, Lend Lease was decisive. Without it, the USSR would've went under without question. From The USSR and Total War: Why Didn’t the Soviet Economy Collapse in 1942? by Mark Harrison:

Boris V. Sokolov (2007). The role of lend‐lease in Soviet military efforts, 1941–1945, The Journal of Slavic Military Studies: Vol. 7, issue 3, pages 567-586.




Throwing everything into the defense of Egypt means the Axis get easy victories at Gibraltar and Malta, as well as means the Balkans disruption never arises which has grave complications as I've previously noted. The fall of Malta in particular, however, has a serious impact on the North Africa front:



The reason for the large jump in April of 1942 is because that was the height of Luftwaffe's suppression of Malta, which enabled the Axis to run more convoys without the need for heavy escort along with more direct routes. With Malta in Axis hands, this is the situation from Mid-1941 onward, which means an effective doubling of supply capacity in North Africa.



I don't foresee that being an issue because the main constraint on Spain is fuel and that is partially alleviated by the fact Franco will be mostly fighting a defensive war, in that he's guarding the Straits, his own coastline and colonies and keeping Salazar in line. By the time the Anglo-Americans can be in a position to threaten him, the USSR will be going under which gives the Germans a much greater ability to assist Madrid. Even better, Spain in the Axis means Berlin gets all of the tungsten from Iberia and at a much cheaper rate than OTL.

The Balkans was decisive in the set up for Barbarossa, the weather was an excuse that only emerged Post-War to explain the situation by Halder and others. Hitler's Balkan Campaign and the Invasion of the USSR by Andrew L. Zapantis found the original weather data, which revealed normal conditions and actually below average flooding. This is reinforced by review of Halder's diary, with the weather never mentioned once as an issue in but equipment losses in the Balkans and such are repeatedly. Even if you take the orthodox view on the weather situation, most sources agree the flood waters had receded by June 10th, leaving an almost two week gap there as well.

However, the start date is not what I'm quibbling over.

Martin Van Creveld's book Hitler's Strategy 1940-1941: the Balkan Clue argues that Operation Lustre (the British intervention into the Balkans) engendered Hitler's decision in March to cancel the planned two-pronged attack by AGS into Ukraine then under planning. Hitler could see the same strategic value in Crete and Greece as the British could, and this provoked grave concern among the Germans that the British could threaten their Southern flank. As a result, 12th Army was diverted to the Balkans for an expanded operation against Greece and, as fate would have it, Yugoslavia. This left the less capable and prepared 11th Army to take their place, with no pincer taking place. Instead, a broad front advance was undertaken which ultimately failed to achieve the encirclements seen elsewhere in Operation Barbarossa and gave AGS a staggered start.

Had there been no Operation Lustre, AGS would've kept 12th Army and achieved a major encirclement in the opening days of Barbarossa whereby 6th, 12th and 26th Armies of the Soviet Southwestern Front would've destroyed. This would've left a gaping hole and seriously impeded Soviet defensive operations on this front, but also would have serious ramifications elsewhere; because of the situation of OTL, the Soviets were able to transfer forces from this sector to face Army Group Center. These were the 16th and 19th Armies, and they played a very serious role in extending out combat operations around Smolensk, inflicting serious attrition on Army Group Center. Here, because of the loss of the three border armies in the opening days, there is no possibility of this occurring due to the serious pressure the Soviets will be under.

The end result of this would thus be no Kiev diversion and Smolensk ending some weeks ahead of schedule, with Army Group Center in better shape than OTL. Operations to secure out the flanks in the North (Velikiye Luki) and South (Central Front) can be conducted handily, which by middle to late August enables AGC to begin a much earlier advance on Moscow as the railways become available. It is highly likely that both Kiev and Leningrad will fall in August or perhaps early September in the case of the latter, while Moscow will follow suit by mid September. By the time of the first snows, AGS can also secure Rostov and the Donets Basin as a whole, while AGN can link up with the Finns around the Svir River. This is fatal for the USSR, and will enable the Germans to complete their victory in 1942 by achieving the Archangelsk-Astrakhan Line, then moving onto the Urals sometime in 1943 or 1944. With the USSR out, the Anglo-Americans will seek an armistice, effectively ending WWII in Europe and setting the stage for a Nazi-American Cold War.



Most of this is outdated, in particular with the alleged underestimation of the Red Army; Enduring the Whirlwind: The German Army and the Russo-German War 1941-1943 by Gregory Liedtke found the German casualty projections were almost spot on until December of 1941. If they were expecting a quick victory and for the Red Army to roll over, it wasn't to be found in their internal planning. Most of what went wrong with Barbarossa was bad operational decisions, not institutional factors with the one thing outside of German control being Operation Lustre and its resulting impact on Hitler's strategic thinking.

Same goes for the impact on operations in the Mediterranean and the overall impact of Lend Lease, as well as the idea the danger period had passed by 1942-1943. Case in point:

The Red Army is often portrayed as overwhelmingly powerful in 1942; for quantitative reasons as much as anything else. In reality it was numerically far weaker than it had been in June of 1941. For instance, in spite of concentrating production on key weapons systems like tanks, aircraft and artillery and mortars the Red Army's stocks hadn't come anywhere close to pre-war levels. In June of 1941 the Red Army had 22,600 tanks on its books. In May of 1942 this total had fallen to 9,325 such machines. Aircraft had dropped from 20,000 to 14,967. Artillery and mortar stocks were down from 112,800 to 107,795 on the eve of the 1942 German summer campaign. Moreover, the increased focus on tank, artillery, and aircraft production that had even enabled the Red Army to maintain such those numbers came at the expense of other very important items - not least of which being truck production.​

​

Why then, did the Germans not achieve decisive success in 1942 and how does this relate to your point about the Med and other theaters? Because it was all inter-connected; the successful Soviet defense was only possible in the context of the Germans also being tied down by the Anglo-Americans. To quote from Western Aid for the Soviet Union During World War II: Part II by Denis Havlat:


Further on:

And, finally, Lend Lease was decisive. Without it, the USSR would've went under without question. From The USSR and Total War: Why Didn’t the Soviet Economy Collapse in 1942? by Mark Harrison:

Boris V. Sokolov (2007). The role of lend‐lease in Soviet military efforts, 1941–1945, The Journal of Slavic Military Studies: Vol. 7, issue 3, pages 567-586.




Throwing everything into the defense of Egypt means the Axis get easy victories at Gibraltar and Malta, as well as means the Balkans disruption never arises which has grave complications as I've previously noted. The fall of Malta in particular, however, has a serious impact on the North Africa front:



The reason for the large jump in April of 1942 is because that was the height of Luftwaffe's suppression of Malta, which enabled the Axis to run more convoys without the need for heavy escort along with more direct routes. With Malta in Axis hands, this is the situation from Mid-1941 onward, which means an effective doubling of supply capacity in North Africa.



I don't foresee that being an issue because the main constraint on Spain is fuel and that is partially alleviated by the fact Franco will be mostly fighting a defensive war, in that he's guarding the Straits, his own coastline and colonies and keeping Salazar in line. By the time the Anglo-Americans can be in a position to threaten him, the USSR will be going under which gives the Germans a much greater ability to assist Madrid. Even better, Spain in the Axis means Berlin gets all of the tungsten from Iberia and at a much cheaper rate than OTL.

The Luftwaffe was worn out by the Battle of Britain and the Balkans campaign OTL, if they are also launching a sustained effort against Gibraltar and Malta and presumably fighting in an enhanced campaign in the desert it doesn't seem there are any savings on wear and tear there. And the resources needed to defend Gibraltar or Malta are fairly insignificant compared to those needed to fight in Libya/Egypt. Operation Felix itself envisioned at least the 16th Panzer Division and one Motorized division as well as various support units being deployed and presumably additional forces would be required for an assault of Malta and an expanded African campaign acting as a fairly good analogue for the OTL Balkans campaign in terms of wearing down equipment for specialist units and the Luftwaffe. The 16th Panzer is important because it was based in Romania in OTL so Army Group South seems to be the go to force to strip assets from.

The OTL Balkan campaign evolved in concert with Felix in part to secure the southern flank, if that rationale is continued its hard to see the Germans not committing to assisting the Italians against Greece and nothing much is there to change Yugoslavia, the Germans may not commit as much as they did OTL if the British themselves do not send W force but there is no reason to assume they'd not deploy some assets and what would be Army Group South and its more potent formations are probably again the go too source for these forces. Maybe 12th army stays in the OOB but its still going to be less effective than initially foreseen and will be operating with less air support than OTL in all likelihood if the Med front is hotter than OTL.

There is also the question of what is used to take Malta, a naval assault seems unlikely given the Italian Navy had ruled it out OTL due to wanting to conserve fuel and the debacle of Toronto and fears the British might intercept from Alexandria. The Germans would probably end up having to do the heavy lifting with paratroopers if the Italians refuse to commit though it is very possible they could be bullied into making the effort. A single division is not holding Malta for long but will certainly cost a lot of men to defeat.

The Germans again got enough supplies through to North Africa, what they never got was enough port and road capacity and that's not something that is going to change with any POD in 1940/1.

Going to have to hit the books on Barbarossa to firm up the dates but my memory is definitely that most of the major delays were largely unrelated to the Balkans given units were already being shifted around and doubts being raised about individual operations and the relatively low number armored and mechanized forces deployed and the fact that many units that participated in Barbarossa were still moving there throughout the Spring so it seems unlikely there would be no delay.

Finally losing easy access to the Med is not too great a factor in Lend Lease. A minor reduction in 1941 is not going to make any difference to Barbarossa, in 1942 it might make a minor one but that is entirely speculative given the vast majority of supplies are going to get through regardless, possibly slower given the Med was used as a rapid route on occasion but not always and the vast majority of tonnage came from other sources. But by 1942 you've probably got Spanish Morroco heavily engaged and the Americans in the war and looking for a front of their own.

Finally maybe Spain could survive without massive economic and military support but Franco consistently demanded both. If he does grant his consent to joining the war that means the Germans and Italians have had to make him suitable promises. No more than Portugal Spain has its own national interests beyond what's best for its patrons. The Spanish at least spent a lot of effort convincing the Germans they needed massive support, maybe they were misleading so at to avoid having to join the war but Franco being Franco is not going to sell himself cheaply regardless and as time goes on Spain will find itself in the fight and he will need German assistence given the utterly wrecked state of Spain after a brutal civil war.

 

[archangel]

In a Portugal joins allies scenario, what becomes of Salazar's legacy? IOTL he is seen in a similar vein in Franco, which doesn't really mean that he has a good reputation. But if Salazar does join the war on the side of the allies I can imagine him becoming an important figure for the radical non-Nazi right (Pat Buchanan, Joseph Sobran etc.). I can imagine he might be seen as similarly to Stalin ITTL but without a Cold War against Communism and with Salazar doing a lot less than Stalin he might be seen as actually better than him. Of course eventually people would have to grapple with who he really was - but overall his reputation would most likely improve and the radical right wouldn't see as much of a beating as they did after World War II.

IMHO, Salazar's opinion would only be better, even ITTL, if he allowed elections. OTL larger and larger portions of the right got angered at his continued refusal to liberalise and allow free elections, and progressively moved into the opposition.

 

[History Learner]

The Luftwaffe was worn out by the Battle of Britain and the Balkans campaign OTL, if they are also launching a sustained effort against Gibraltar and Malta and presumably fighting in an enhanced campaign in the desert it doesn't seem there are any savings on wear and tear there. And the resources needed to defend Gibraltar or Malta are fairly insignificant compared to those needed to fight in Libya/Egypt. Operation Felix itself envisioned at least the 16th Panzer Division and one Motorized division as well as various support units being deployed and presumably additional forces would be required for an assault of Malta and an expanded African campaign acting as a fairly good analogue for the OTL Balkans campaign in terms of wearing down equipment for specialist units and the Luftwaffe. The 16th Panzer is important because it was based in Romania in OTL so Army Group South seems to be the go to force to strip assets from.

The Battle of Britain was not a fundamental breaking point for the Luftwaffe, and losses during the Balkans Campaign were actually low outside of Ju-52 losses around Crete. Overall, however, I think there's a contradiction in this argument; if the British are putting insignificant forces forward to defend Gibraltar and Malta, then how exactly are they inflicting severe wear and tear on the Germans? Even presuming a 1 to 2 month campaign for Gibraltar, for example, that still leaves four months (using OTL start date) to rest and rebuild after the operation is complete. Once Gibraltar falls there is no reason 16th Panzer is kept static in Spain, that's garrison duty the Spanish Army itself can fill. Likewise, there's no real reason to assume this duty would enforce a serious burden on the Heer, as Operation Felix envisioned a siege out, meaning 16th Panzer will have minimal equipment and manpower losses. Same goes for the Luftwaffe, as shown IOTL; VIII Air Fleet was used to suppress Malta from December of 1941 to May of 1942, being thereafter immediately transferred for duty in the East for Fall Blau.

The OTL Balkan campaign evolved in concert with Felix in part to secure the southern flank, if that rationale is continued its hard to see the Germans not committing to assisting the Italians against Greece and nothing much is there to change Yugoslavia, the Germans may not commit as much as they did OTL if the British themselves do not send W force but there is no reason to assume they'd not deploy some assets and what would be Army Group South and its more potent formations are probably again the go too source for these forces. Maybe 12th army stays in the OOB but its still going to be less effective than initially foreseen and will be operating with less air support than OTL in all likelihood if the Med front is hotter than OTL.

The Balkan Campaign, as it was, evolved in terms of circumstances forced by the Allies which may or may not happen here. Prior to the British reinforcing Greece and deeply concerning Hitler about the use of Crete as an airbase against Romania, Operation Marita was envisioned as a very minor thing. To quote Creveld on the matter:

Although ‘directive No. 20’ had mentioned the possibility that operation ‘Marita’ would be extended to include more Greek territory than just the Aegean Coast, all preparations had hitherto been made on the assumption that this would not be the case. Thus, the OKH plan of 14 February allocated only one week to the entire operation, and as late as 8 March Warlimont complained that it was not clear how far the occupation was to be extended. In view of the British landings in Greece the question became even more urgent, and on 17 March it was answered in a drastic manner by Hitler; the operation, he ordered, was to be continued until the British were driven from the entire Greek mainland, including the Peloponnese.​

Halder's diary entry concerning the meeting directly states that, as a result of the expanded Operation Marita, 12th Army would have to be scrapped from Barbarossa Planning. Could the British still go forward with Operation Lustre and thus everything goes IOTL? Sure, but that means Spain and Italy both have a much easier time of it defending their colonies and taking Malta, respectively, as the British don't have much of a strategic reserve at this time. My presumption is that Gibraltar, Malta and a better North Africa front for the Axis would so over-tax the Commonwealth that they cannot engage in Operation Lustre.

There is also the question of what is used to take Malta, a naval assault seems unlikely given the Italian Navy had ruled it out OTL due to wanting to conserve fuel and the debacle of Toronto and fears the British might intercept from Alexandria. The Germans would probably end up having to do the heavy lifting with paratroopers if the Italians refuse to commit though it is very possible they could be bullied into making the effort. A single division is not holding Malta for long but will certainly cost a lot of men to defeat.

I honestly have no idea where this idea comes concerning the Italian Navy, as they were an active and eager participant into 1942 concerning invasion plans:

On 17 January 1942, Kesselring accepted the Italian idea to capture Malta by an airborne and amphibious assault.39 At a subsequent meeting with Cavallero and Admiral Arturo Riccardi, Chief of Staff of the Regia Marina (Italian Royal Navy) on 8 February, they went further into the details of the necessary requirements in terms of vessels and landing crafts, and established a suitable period for the execution of the operation for the following June-July period.40 Since then, Kesselring strove to persuade Hitler to support the Italians with reinforcements and equipment. The meeting with Hitler and Goering in mid-February, whose narration opened this monograph, was followed by a message from the Ober Kommando der Heeres dated 17 February 1942, which ordered that arrangements should be made for a combined Italo-German invasion of Malta.41 This would be the first time the Axis designed an operation using a combined staff. On 23 February, Cavallero in turn ordered General Vittorio Ambrosio, Chief of Staff of the Regio Esercito, to speed up the revision of the plans for Esigenza C3. 42​

The Germans again got enough supplies through to North Africa, what they never got was enough port and road capacity and that's not something that is going to change with any POD in 1940/1.

That's simply not true at all, to quote from the above source:

November was truly a disastrous month for the Axis in the Central Mediterranean. Of the 79,208 tons of oil and equipment dispatched, only 29,843 tons arrived in North Africa. Only 2,471 tons of fuel arrived and this was carried aboard the Italian Navy’s warships. In 20 days of operations at sea, the Axis had lost 13 cargo ships and three destroyers, with two cruisers suffering heavy damage. Marcantonio Bragadin, The Italian Navy in World War II (Annapolis, Md: U.S. Naval Institute, 1957), 141.​

Indeed, you can also look at throughput at the ports to see this; IIRC June of 1941 and April of 1942 had absolutely massive throughput and this can be explained by Malta being unable to serve as an interdiction spot for Axis logistics. Certainly rail/truck capacity was a factor, but it was never the sole defining reason.

Going to have to hit the books on Barbarossa to firm up the dates but my memory is definitely that most of the major delays were largely unrelated to the Balkans given units were already being shifted around and doubts being raised about individual operations and the relatively low number armored and mechanized forces deployed and the fact that many units that participated in Barbarossa were still moving there throughout the Spring so it seems unlikely there would be no delay.

The orthodox narrative has been that, but it has been increasingly challenged for decades. If it was rains and floods that delayed the onset of Operation Barbarossa, one has to come up with an explanation of why the staging data doesn't show serious flooding above normal levels or why the meteorological reports don't account for above usual rain either. Perhaps equally damning is that not one of the Post-War proponents of the bad weather hypothesis make mention of it in their own personal records, but those-such as Halder-do specifically single out the effect of the Balkans. Simply put, there just isn't any evidence for an alternative explanation.

Finally losing easy access to the Med is not too great a factor in Lend Lease. A minor reduction in 1941 is not going to make any difference to Barbarossa, in 1942 it might make a minor one but that is entirely speculative given the vast majority of supplies are going to get through regardless, possibly slower given the Med was used as a rapid route on occasion but not always and the vast majority of tonnage came from other sources. But by 1942 you've probably got Spanish Morroco heavily engaged and the Americans in the war and looking for a front of their own.

I agree, my point about Lend Lease was in response to your general statement concerning it.

Finally maybe Spain could survive without massive economic and military support but Franco consistently demanded both. If he does grant his consent to joining the war that means the Germans and Italians have had to make him suitable promises. No more than Portugal Spain has its own national interests beyond what's best for its patrons. The Spanish at least spent a lot of effort convincing the Germans they needed massive support, maybe they were misleading so at to avoid having to join the war but Franco being Franco is not going to sell himself cheaply regardless and as time goes on Spain will find itself in the fight and he will need German assistence given the utterly wrecked state of Spain after a brutal civil war.

Asking for a lot is just good diplomacy or in negotiations in general, at least as a starting point; that's just how it goes. Franco was certainly interested in joining the war, the main issue was Hitler was hesitant; Mussolini and Vichy France both had reasons to want to keep Spain at arms length and Franco's demands irritated Hitler on a personal level. Overall, however, Spain would not be that great of a burden for Nazi Germany, even on the oil issue. I recently discovered An Elephant in the Garden: The Allies, Spain, and Oil in World War II and found out Spain's total oil demand was 500,000 tons per annum. That's for all POL products, not just oil, and to put that into perspective that's about half of what Hungary produced in a year. Not Romania, not Germany's synthetics, just little old Hungary alone.