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Potential consequences of a successful Monmouth rebellion

von mises

"...and originated in Wales."
This isn't particularly plausible, but given the discussion about the Jacobites yesterday in the Royal wedding thread I thought making the assumption that it could be successful might be interesting.

In 1685 the illegitimate son of Charles II, the Duke of Monmouth, landed in Lyme Regis and launched the Monmouth rebellion which resulted in the catastrophic defeat at Sedgemoor and the Bloody Assizes, and Monmouth got his head hacked off by Jack Ketch for his troubles.

However, what effects might a successful Monmouth rebellion have? I can see the Bill of Rights getting butterflied, with the lack of parliamentary involvement in the removal of James, but what about Ireland? Would we just see the *Williamite wars brought forward a few years or would a return via Ireland be rendered implausible through this?
 
This isn't particularly plausible, but given the discussion about the Jacobites yesterday in the Royal wedding thread I thought making the assumption that it could be successful might be interesting.

In 1685 the illegitimate son of Charles II, the Duke of Monmouth, landed in Lyme Regis and launched the Monmouth rebellion which resulted in the catastrophic defeat at Sedgemoor and the Bloody Assizes, and Monmouth got his head hacked off by Jack Ketch for his troubles.

However, what effects might a successful Monmouth rebellion have? I can see the Bill of Rights getting butterflied, with the lack of parliamentary involvement in the removal of James, but what about Ireland? Would we just see the *Williamite wars brought forward a few years or would a return via Ireland be rendered implausible through this?

I've been thinking of doing this timeline, and I've come to the conclusion that a successful Monmouth rebellion would need to be a very different Monmouth rebellion.

Essentially, by the time the rebellion starts then barring a miracle he can't win.

However, if we do see a miracle then well that's consequence one. It won't be Protestant Wind, but instead a different miracle.

We might also see William still invade/be invited by ambitious MPs which may lead to interesting things depending on what you decide to do.

James-Scott had supporters during the Exclusion Crisis, so we might see it declared by Parliament that Charles II postponing of parliament to avoid Acts of Exclusion was tyrannical and we just see a different Bill of Rights with a retroactive preamble akin to an Act of Exclusion a la Henry VII or some Bill of Rights along with a true Act of Exclusion.

James-Scott was also very popular with the army, and it was due to this that he was exiled by Charles to avoid him leading a military coup, so we might see a different historiography of the Restoration as being remembered as a military thing more.

Alt-Williamite Wars depend on what happens to James II, and how James-Scott makes noises during the rebellion. Monmouth is a bastard himself and might see some of his own in Ireland that might see tolerance for them (of a sort) early, or he might be able to create this impression long enough to see a purge of the Clans in Ireland after the throne is secure akin to efforts against the Welsh Marcher Lords in the early 1500s.

Lots of freedom in short, even more if you decide to alter the rebellion beforehand. Remember that Monmouth was also being aided by the Argyll rebellion which pledged allegiance to him. You'll have to decide if that rebellion also succeeds or if that fails causing a war in Scotland aswell.
 
I don't think there was the slightest chance of the Monmouth Rebellion of OTL succeeding, because it was based on a completely faulty premise, which is to say that when given the chance the country would rise and the elites would throw their lot in behind Monmouth Because Catholicism. There's probably some degree of hindsight in that for us, but not, I think, a huge amount. It's true that Monmouth had been talked of as an alternate prospect for king only a few years before, but that mood had discredited itself in the meantime, and there's a huge difference between a legal succession and an invasion when James was already king.

I think from the reports we have of the first few months of James' reign it should have been clear he was in a honeymoon period at the time, and that was the worst point to launch an invasion; people were impressed that everything had been so smooth, James made some quite reassuring gestures, and people were clearly struck that James hadn't started burning Protestants etc. In consequence Monmouth landed in a region which was supposed to be favourable and managed nothing other than to impress a few farm hands. It was never going to fly.
 
I don't think there was the slightest chance of the Monmouth Rebellion of OTL succeeding, because it was based on a completely faulty premise, which is to say that when given the chance the country would rise and the elites would throw their lot in behind Monmouth Because Catholicism. There's probably some degree of hindsight in that for us, but not, I think, a huge amount. It's true that Monmouth had been talked of as an alternate prospect for king only a few years before, but that mood had discredited itself in the meantime, and there's a huge difference between a legal succession and an invasion when James was already king.

I think from the reports we have of the first few months of James' reign it should have been clear he was in a honeymoon period at the time, and that was the worst point to launch an invasion; people were impressed that everything had been so smooth, James made some quite reassuring gestures, and people were clearly struck that James hadn't started burning Protestants etc. In consequence Monmouth landed in a region which was supposed to be favourable and managed nothing other than to impress a few farm hands. It was never going to fly.


I would agree James seemed to have a "honeymoon" period, but if we look at the man over his life we see that he's awful at overreacting to threats, given how the trials from this Monmouth rebellion and the executions caused William's attack.

I do think you say too much against the rebellion that would seem to equally apply to the Glorious Revolution.

While I would agree that they were different, the fact remains that both rebellions had similar motivations and saw equally illegitimate results (or attempted results) and that James II is generally not as doomed as first let on, we should not forget his ability to turn his great reputation of pre-coronation to an awful one in very short time.
 
I would agree James seemed to have a "honeymoon" period, but if we look at the man over his life we see that he's awful at overreacting to threats, given how the trials from this Monmouth rebellion and the executions caused William's attack.

I do think you say too much against the rebellion that would seem to equally apply to the Glorious Revolution.

While I would agree that they were different, the fact remains that both rebellions had similar motivations and saw equally illegitimate results (or attempted results) and that James II is generally not as doomed as first let on, we should not forget his ability to turn his great reputation of pre-coronation to an awful one in very short time.

My point is that the political situations between the start of James' reign and the time of William's invasion were wholly different, and so you can't transplant the 1688 situation onto the 1685 one and think there could be a similar outcome. William's invasion was an infinitely better-resourced one than Monmouth's and it was lead by a much more serious proposition in a foreign prince like William instead of a popular captain like Monmouth - Because the political situation had opened up completely.

Nothing better illustrates this than the fact that in 1688 William was heading the invasion; in 1685, he was sending troops to James to put down Monmouth's rebellion. It's night and day in terms of the political situation. Even if Monmouth had won at Sedgemoor and his night attack succeeded (And hostile commentary at the time thought he could have) then he would have still been facing that wall. In 1688 William had both in quality and numbers an army which could credibly take on James'. Monmouth had nothing like that. He was winging it.

Though William landed in the South West to exploit what was believed to be the lingering resentment over Jeffrey's assizes, it's not what caused James' fall; there was a lot of time between Summer 1685 and late 1688 during which James blotted his copybook politically. James certainly didn't over-react in 1688, he very much underreacted.
 
My point is that the political situations between the start of James' reign and the time of William's invasion were wholly different, and so you can't transplant the 1688 situation onto the 1685 one and think there could be a similar outcome. William's invasion was an infinitely better-resourced one than Monmouth's and it was lead by a much more serious proposition in a foreign prince like William instead of a popular captain like Monmouth - Because the political situation had opened up completely.

Nothing better illustrates this than the fact that in 1688 William was heading the invasion; in 1685, he was sending troops to James to put down Monmouth's rebellion. It's night and day in terms of the political situation. Even if Monmouth had won at Sedgemoor and his night attack succeeded (And hostile commentary at the time thought he could have) then he would have still been facing that wall. In 1688 William had both in quality and numbers an army which could credibly take on James'. Monmouth had nothing like that. He was winging it.

Though William landed in the South West to exploit what was believed to be the lingering resentment over Jeffrey's assizes, it's not what caused James' fall; there was a lot of time between Summer 1685 and late 1688 during which James blotted his copybook politically. James certainly didn't over-react in 1688, he very much underreacted.

I think you underestimate the effect of a military victory at Sedgemoor, and the potential reaction of James II that might cause people to affect to the rebellion.

A military victory at Sedgemoor would have meant that many of the more radical Protestants and those who had been pushing the Exclusion crisis might throw their lot in now that there was a chance.

As mentioned James-Scott was very popular in the army, with a victory under his belt I wouldn't be surprised to see something akin to the beginning of the Hundred Days happen with any government armies.

Fundamentally, my point is that there was great space for opportunity and that any claim that there was not is making ironclad claims about a situation that never in actually came to be and so cannot be tested so to speak.

I don't doubt that the rebellion had little chance, but for your comment that there wasn't "the slightest chance" I couldn't disagree more.
 
I think you underestimate the effect of a military victory at Sedgemoor, and the potential reaction of James II that might cause people to affect to the rebellion.

A military victory at Sedgemoor would have meant that many of the more radical Protestants and those who had been pushing the Exclusion crisis might throw their lot in now that there was a chance.

As mentioned James-Scott was very popular in the army, with a victory under his belt I wouldn't be surprised to see something akin to the beginning of the Hundred Days happen with any government armies.

Fundamentally, my point is that there was great space for opportunity and that any claim that there was not is making ironclad claims about a situation that never in actually came to be and so cannot be tested so to speak.

I don't doubt that the rebellion had little chance, but for your comment that there wasn't "the slightest chance" I couldn't disagree more.

The Whigs who supported Monmouth during the exclusion crisis had been pretty thoroughly beaten and dispersed in the aftermath of the Rye House plot, and those who were judged to be potentially troublesome were placed under imprisonment for the duration, so again, you're really overegging the pudding - I mean, even Argyll (Whose rebellion had already sputtered by the time of Sedgemoor) disavowed Monmouth when he learned he'd (repeatedly) crowned himself King in his west country progress.

The Tories were really in ascendancy at the start of James' reign - partly due to the government's control and pressure of course, but there's no doubt that there was a public opinion swing too. James thought there was only about two score members he wouldn't have chosen himself in his first parliament. I think you're still ultimately assuming that the situations in 1685 and 1688 were alike, both in the politics and the individuals, and they just weren't. 1688 came about only due to years of James totally squandering his pretty strong starting position.

If you're bugged out by the 'slightest chance' wording then okay, then let's re-phrase it as 'minimal opportunity'. That's the reality; and claiming that there was a "great opportunity" and that's inarguable is just silly.
 
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The Whigs who supported Monmouth during the exclusion crisis had been pretty thoroughly beaten and dispersed in the aftermath of the Rye House plot, and those who were judged to be potentially troublesome were placed under imprisonment for the duration, so again, you're really overegging the pudding - I mean, even Argyll (Whose rebellion had already sputtered by the time of Sedgemoor) disavowed Monmouth when he learned he'd (repeatedly) crowned himself King in his west country progress.

The Tories were really in ascendancy at the start of James' reign - partly due to the government's control and pressure of course, but there's no doubt that there was a public opinion swing too. James thought there was only about two score members he wouldn't have chosen himself in his first parliament. I think you're still ultimately assuming that the situations in 1685 and 1688 were alike, both in the politics and the individuals, and they just weren't. 1688 came about only due to years of James totally squandering his pretty strong starting position.

If you're bugged out by the 'slightest chance' wording then okay, then let's re-phrase it as 'minimal opportunity'. That's the reality; and claiming that there was a "great opportunity" and that's inarguable is just silly.


I'm going to have to fundamentally disagree that 1685 and 1688 were unalike. My point is not that 1685 is a direct prior example/precursor but more that there was a similar opportunity that could be exploited if the rebellion had lasted longer.

When I spoke of great opportunity, I spoke more of the fact that we do not know if James in reaction to a Monmouth with victory at Sedgemoor and beyond would manage to overplay his hand and create circumstances more favourable to the rebels. It is here that I refer to great opportunity, in that there is a wide range towards the fact that we know not how James would respond to his forces failing to suppress a rebellion.

Again we must consider that Monmouth was a very popular man in the army that means with victories under his belt that he would likely attract more troops and potentially given circumstances even whole armies.

The problem with your statements of there being no chance is that a victory at Sedgemoor changes everything in terms of the rebellion. Few rebellions on English/3 Kingdoms soil won battles and most were prolonged by a lack of battle. Notable exceptions include the Nine Years War and Kett's Rebellion. Fundamentally to see a rebel victory over the government is itself groundbreaking and everyone at the time would be aware of this. The rebellion and the government response would both likely transform utterly due to this upset.
 
I'm going to have to fundamentally disagree that 1685 and 1688 were unalike. My point is not that 1685 is a direct prior example/precursor but more that there was a similar opportunity that could be exploited if the rebellion had lasted longer.

When I spoke of great opportunity, I spoke more of the fact that we do not know if James in reaction to a Monmouth with victory at Sedgemoor and beyond would manage to overplay his hand and create circumstances more favourable to the rebels. It is here that I refer to great opportunity, in that there is a wide range towards the fact that we know not how James would respond to his forces failing to suppress a rebellion.

Again we must consider that Monmouth was a very popular man in the army that means with victories under his belt that he would likely attract more troops and potentially given circumstances even whole armies.

The problem with your statements of there being no chance is that a victory at Sedgemoor changes everything in terms of the rebellion. Few rebellions on English/3 Kingdoms soil won battles and most were prolonged by a lack of battle. Notable exceptions include the Nine Years War and Kett's Rebellion. Fundamentally to see a rebel victory over the government is itself groundbreaking and everyone at the time would be aware of this. The rebellion and the government response would both likely transform utterly due to this upset.

Defeat at Sedgemoor would obviously change the situation, but I still don't think you're really grasping how weak Monmouth's situation was and how strong James' was, and particularly by the time of Sedgemoor the whole rebellion was on the verge of collapse. It feels like you're still basically assuming that Monmouth just needs to be put into the right sort circumstances to play the part of William and carry all before him, which emphatically isn't the case. I still feel you're basically assuming the political situation was identical, which means an equal opportunity, which it just wasn't.

But since you don't seem too curious about the political situation, let's turn to the military situation and the differences with 1688. Monmouth arrived with just a handful of followers, (How big a force William rocked up with in 1688 is disputed, but it was certainly many, many thousand of professional troops) had minimal supplies, and a blind hope that he'd have massive domestic support with immediate risings. You keep repeating his popularity as an army captain as a mantra, but you don't seem to be taking into account how that was tested IOTL and found wanting. Monmouth didn't land in the South West by chance, he landed there because it was chosen as his most favourable region during the exclusion crisis and because it was seen to be very Protestant. Well, he did get some militia defections, but nothing spectacular. Most of what grew his force was just warm bodies; just labourers and artisans. This in, supposedly, his most favourable region.

By Sedgemoor, Monmouth had been contained, was being pushed back, was leaking troops on the news of Argyll's defeat, and had suffered from his route of escape being cut off by the navy, so he had no chance of reinforcements or resupply. That's really the situation - Sedgemoor was the last gasp roll of the dice. It wasn't a five miles from London thing. Victory would bring the rebellion stunningly back from the dead, but your implied assumption that it would automatically lead all the way to London is one hell of a leap. More likely is some defections, some more manoeuvres in the South West, and further containment until James had mustered his full force. Round two rather than government collapse.

I mean, what you're saying is that shit happens, which I would agree with, but I think given the relative situations, James would still be in a strong position even if Sedgemoor had gone the other way. The royal forces could come back from that, James was mustering further troops, but as was demonstrated IOTL, Monmouth just needed to be defeated once. You're free to believe that one defeat would have collapsed the entire royal position, but to go back to the start, given James' was in a much stronger position to 1688 and the invaders a much weaker one, it's unlikely that we'd see the exact repeat of William's invasion that you're clearly envisaging.
 
Defeat at Sedgemoor would obviously change the situation, but I still don't think you're really grasping how weak Monmouth's situation was and how strong James' was, and particularly by the time of Sedgemoor the whole rebellion was on the verge of collapse. It feels like you're still basically assuming that Monmouth just needs to be put into the right sort circumstances to play the part of William and carry all before him, which emphatically isn't the case. I still feel you're basically assuming the political situation was identical, which means an equal opportunity, which it just wasn't.

But since you don't seem too curious about the political situation, let's turn to the military situation and the differences with 1688. Monmouth arrived with just a handful of followers, (How big a force William rocked up with in 1688 is disputed, but it was certainly many, many thousand of professional troops) had minimal supplies, and a blind hope that he'd have massive domestic support with immediate risings. You keep repeating his popularity as an army captain as a mantra, but you don't seem to be taking into account how that was tested IOTL and found wanting. Monmouth didn't land in the South West by chance, he landed there because it was chosen as his most favourable region during the exclusion crisis and because it was seen to be very Protestant. Well, he did get some militia defections, but nothing spectacular. Most of what grew his force was just warm bodies; just labourers and artisans. This in, supposedly, his most favourable region.

By Sedgemoor, Monmouth had been contained, was being pushed back, was leaking troops on the news of Argyll's defeat, and had suffered from his route of escape being cut off by the navy, so he had no chance of reinforcements or resupply. That's really the situation - Sedgemoor was the last gasp roll of the dice. It wasn't a five miles from London thing. Victory would bring the rebellion stunningly back from the dead, but your implied assumption that it would automatically lead all the way to London is one hell of a leap. More likely is some defections, some more manoeuvres in the South West, and further containment until James had mustered his full force. Round two rather than government collapse.

I mean, what you're saying is that shit happens, which I would agree with, but I think given the relative situations, James would still be in a strong position even if Sedgemoor had gone the other way. The royal forces could come back from that, James was mustering further troops, but as was demonstrated IOTL, Monmouth just needed to be defeated once. You're free to believe that one defeat would have collapsed the entire royal position, but to go back to the start, given James' was in a much stronger position to 1688 and the invaders a much weaker one, it's unlikely that we'd see the exact repeat of William's invasion that you're clearly envisaging.

I'm really not, my point entirely is that as you said "things happen" and that a victory for James-Scott at Sedgemoor upends the conventional wisdom.

I never once stated that it would lead to an automatic victory, only stating that few rebellions ever won a battle and that his doing would drastically upend the assumed dynamic by James, you've argued that James under-reacted to William and yet seem to think he wouldn't under-react here.

If you recall again, this thread was initially about the consequences of a successful rebellion, hence my original comments regarding a miracle at Sedgemoor which with the OTL rebellion would be needed. My point is not that the rebellion was likely to succeed, just that this thread is based on the consequences of a successful rebellion. Erego reasons must be looked at for how that could come about to see what would be the consequences of that, hence my focus on how he could have won not how unlikely he was to win.

Fundamentally, the question asked when looking at the consequences is how to derive them. For any consequences to be derived, then the rebellion must succeed for this question, therefore it must be looked at to see how it would succeed.

Do recall that especially in this context, the commenting is not of the reality of the situation (of which you increasingly seem to ignore how much I agree with you on) but of how that reality could change. I challenge you to using a PoD after the rebellion begins in the South West find another way for the rebellion to succeed and thus a set of consequences for the actual primary purpose of this thread. Your first statement was to say it could never happen, which you yourself agree was meant more to mean highly unlikely and yet you refused to indulge in finding what the consequences of that unlikely circumstance would be.
 
I mean, you said earlier you were thinking about writing a timeline about this being a success, and I don't write people's timelines for them via these discussions. Not anymore anyway, I got wise to that shit a long time ago. I contribute as much as I enjoy contributing, and it's you who took up my initial post in the thread.

Monmouth winning is basically a throwing six sixes in a row thing. You just need to deliberately make it so that everything goes right for him and nothing for the government, which for reasons I've gone over is a very marginal possibility. But I'm not even sure it's that interesting a scenario, because even if he did take the capital and James fled abroad, it's quite possible you ultimately end up with something analogous to OTL, with William eventually invading. There is the quite funny possibility of James dying/becoming morbidly celibate sometime soon after his deposition, which would almost certainly eventually result in William and his wife, Jacobite heir Mary, invading to recover her rightful title from a bastard adventurer with no real claim to the throne. Given how weak Monmouth's position as such a usurper would be, it would almost certainly succeed. I don't even think it would result in a more 'Tory' monarchy, because such a monarchical shit show would probably put the monarchy in quite a series of weak positions and in need of internal sanction. It might actually result in a mildly weaker monarchy to OTL.
 
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I mean, you said earlier you were thinking about writing a timeline about this being a success, and I don't write people's timelines for them via these discussions. Not anymore anyway, I got wise to that shit a long time ago. I contribute as much as I enjoy contributing, and it's you who took up my initial post in the thread.

Monmouth winning is basically a throwing six sixes in a row thing. You just need to deliberately make it so that everything goes right for him and nothing for the government, which for reasons I've gone over is a very marginal possibility. But I'm not even sure it's that interesting a scenario, because even if he did take the capital and James fled abroad, it's quite possible you ultimately end up with something analogous to OTL, with William eventually invading. There is the quite funny possibility of James dying/becoming morbidly celibate sometime soon after his deposition, which would almost certainly eventually result in William and his wife, Jacobite heir Mary, invading to recover her rightful title from a bastard adventurer with no real claim to the throne. Given how weak Monmouth's position as such a usurper would be, it would almost certainly succeed.

I think you missed the part where I said it would need to be a very different Monmouth rebellion to succeed, by which I meant that it would be a Monmouth Rebellion very dissimilar to the Monmouth Rebellion.

Though I will say that do agree that a Williamite attempt is likely if James-Scott is successful. So that's an obvious consequence, though I think a more interesting scenario is to have two seperate exillic lines attempting to take back the throne, one Marian and one Jacobite and to see some interplay there.
 
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