Moroccan rebellion during the Spanish Civil War

[Gary Oswald]

So during the Spanish Civil War, the nationalists relied largely on their Moroccan subjects for manpower during the early stages of the war. The Republicans therefore had some interest in disrupting Spanish Morocco and there was a plan to promise to recognise Moroccan independence if there was a large scale Moroccan Rebellion in 1936. The French however told the Republicans that they were entirely opposed to this and so the plans to smuggle weapons into Morocco largely died. The Catalan leader apparently threated to withdraw his forces from the front lines entirely if the Republicans weren't willing to give morocco independence but if looks like his bluff was called and nothing happened as a result.

The longer the war went on, the more desperate the Republicans got and the more likely however there was to be independent action in Morocco. In 1938, there was an apparently unauthorised planned raid into Morocco from Tangiers that was foiled by the nationalists and at least one Spanish rebel did move into Morocco to attempt to raise up a revolution but with no success.

In early 1937 Pierre Besnard of the French Anarchi-Syndicalist League proposed that the easiest way to start a rebellion in Spanish Morocco was to bring back the anti colonial rebel Abd el Krim, the leader of the Rif Republic, who had humiliated the Spanish at Annual. He was currently being held at the French island of Reunion and Besnard proposed that if the Spanish Republicans could agree on a deal, Besbard could visit reunion, deliver a proposed agreement and break el Krim out of prison if the latter accepted it.

This is a very bold plan given it involves basically attacking the neutral country you have the longest border with and unsurprisingly Largo Cabalerro said fuck off. Which seems to be the big flaw in all these plans. It's impossible to disrupt Spanish Morocco without also disrupting French morocco and by and large noone was willing to risk pissing off the French.

But to an extent a rebellion did break out in Morocco would that have been a game changer? Was it a possible war winning tactic?

 

[Creekmench]

While, I think it can tactically delay the Nationalists leading to a Republican Victory, it may cause France to send down tanks to Madrid or arm the Nationalists to the teeth if Blum can't declare war bc the PF won't let a war happen. IMO the Republic's best shot is to prevent the Coup in the first place.

 

[Charles EP M.]

I can see a Moroccan uprising damaging the nationalists enough to swing the war, but as Creekmench says if the war's not won ASAP it probably brings the French in - and I assume the Spanish republicans will, to stave off any threat from France, cut off the Moroccans and go "new phone who dis" when French troops go over to 'pacify'. (Or Italians, maybe, seeing a way to nab land)

 

[The Red]

As noted a rebellion actually breaking out is unlikely for numerous reasons so if one did break out the instance itself could be a game changer in merely representing a sea change in an area that the Nationalists had solidly been in control of and were using as a significant reinforcement of manpower for the Army of Africa. Turn those two elements around, make Morocco unstable for the Nationalists and make it a sink rather than a boon for manpower and you're looking at a change in not only the dynamics of the war but also in the nature of the conflict.

Franco was an uncharismatic and unassuming officer who climbed to the top largely on the basis that more plausible leaders kept dying in plane crashes but his leadership of the Army of Africa was the reason his star rose at all to the extent he could prove himself as a shrewd political operator. Had a rebellion broken out in Morocco in the early days of the war then the Nationalists are probably finished, period but presuming we wait for Largo Caballero to give in to his better nature, and for everyone to somehow go along with it, and declare independence for Morocco alongside every harebrained scheme to fulfill that aim resulting in chaos across the strait in 1937 then Franco will lose a lot of legitimacy, potentially to the extent he fails to force together the disparate elements of the Nationalists or even gets overshadowed by someone like Queipo de Llano. Granted Queipo de Llano himself laid out the reasons why Franco rose to power, everyone else was dead or out of the country and he personally had devoted himself to boasting about and encouraging the worst excesses of the white terror over the radio for everyone to hear, so maybe Franco's political and not-dying-in-plane-crash skills see him though regardless.

Regardless this puts the Nationalist's slow and steady approach adopted after Madrid into overdrive, the Nationalists will likely only be getting to attacks against the Basque country by 1939 and presuming the Republic's worship of bombastic offensives doesn't either reach a critical mass in dealing the Nationalists a terminal blow or causing the Republican economy to completely collapse then the overall Republican strategy of holding out until a general European war breaks out is likely to be fulfilled. Then they just have to sit back and wait for the Anglo-French to come to the rescue, the same people they ruined their relationship with by declaring Moroccan independence. Still, there's always Stalin aaaand he's just greenlit the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact.

 

[Death's Companion]

Do the French take this lying down?

 

[Venocara]

Franco was an uncharismatic and unassuming officer who climbed to the top largely on the basis that more plausible leaders kept dying in plane crashes

How many of them did die in plane crashes? I thought it was only Jose Sanjurjo.

 

[The Red]

How many of them did die in plane crashes? I thought it was only Jose Sanjurjo.

Mola as well, although there's some questions it did look like fairly normal circumstances for a plane crash at the time. This is in contrast to Sanjurjo whose plane crash almost certainly was accidental but, to paraphrase Curb Your Enthusiasm, consisted of so many stupid things that it looked like foul play.

 

[Nanwe]

Mola as well, although there's some questions it did look like fairly normal circumstances for a plane crash at the time. This is in contrast to Sanjurjo whose plane crash almost certainly was accidental but, to paraphrase Curb Your Enthusiasm, consisted of so many stupid things that it looked like foul play.

He had to carry all his uniforms, y'know?

 

[Ricardolindo]

Mola as well, although there's some questions it did look like fairly normal circumstances for a plane crash at the time. This is in contrast to Sanjurjo whose plane crash almost certainly was accidental but, to paraphrase Curb Your Enthusiasm, consisted of so many stupid things that it looked like foul play.

By the time of Mola's place crash, Franco had already been selected as leader.
As for Sanjurjo, he was simply eccentric, which led him to enter a dangerous flight.

 

[The Red]

By the time of Mola's place crash, Franco had already been selected as leader.

That's true of OTL but if there's a successful rebellion in Morocco then Franco goes from being the commander of the most powerful forces in the Nationalist Army to just another general in a group of conspirators. Even if the rebellion is to break out after Franco has become supreme commander and head of government his hold on these titles becomes shakier. With the Army of Africa suffering losses due to attrition in Spain whilst the Nationalists have to send forces to Morocco to maintain control Franco may struggle to consolidate power around himself with this loss of legitimacy, particularly if Mola's death is butterflied. If the civil war continues on into the Second World War Franco might also find being Hitler's choice isn't an advantage when German support drys up all of a sudden. Mola and Queipo de Llano, alongside the Carlists and Falangists, could decide it's time for a reshuffle.

 

[Yokai Man]

That's true of OTL but if there's a successful rebellion in Morocco then Franco goes from being the commander of the most powerful forces in the Nationalist Army to just another general in a group of conspirators. Even if the rebellion is to break out after Franco has become supreme commander and head of government his hold on these titles becomes shakier. With the Army of Africa suffering losses due to attrition in Spain whilst the Nationalists have to send forces to Morocco to maintain control Franco may struggle to consolidate power around himself with this loss of legitimacy, particularly if Mola's death is butterflied. If the civil war continues on into the Second World War Franco might also find being Hitler's choice isn't an advantage when German support drys up all of a sudden. Mola and Queipo de Llano, alongside the Carlists and Falangists, could decide it's time for a reshuffle.

How would a Mola led Spain look?

 

[The Red]

How would a Mola led Spain look?

Based on his initial designs, a right-wing authoritarian republic which remained secular and with some limited form of parliamentary democracy. The Carlists and Falangists would likely be allowed their independence but would be kept at arm's length.

 

[Venocara]

Based on his intial designs, a right-wing authoritarian republic which remained secular and with some limited form of parliamentary democracy. The Carlists and Falangists would likely be allowed their independence but would be kept at arm's length.

How about a Spain led by Sanjurjo or Queipo de Llano?

 

[The Red]

How about a Spain led by Sanjurjo or Queipo de Llano?

Mola had Sanjurjo in mind as head of state, given the man's arrogance ultimately led him to his death it's likely such a regime would have resembled Primo de Rivera's dictatorship. I'm not sure about Queipo de Llano, as mentioned he'd sort of ruled himself out so I doubt he had any plans drawn up.

 

[Gary Oswald]

I assume the Spanish republicans will, to stave off any threat from France, cut off the Moroccans and go "new phone who dis" when French troops go over to 'pacify'. (Or Italians, maybe, seeing a way to nab land)

Which is the other reason to assume itll never happen, there isnt the trust there. There were, of course, Morrocans who fought for the republicans and rebel groups who were willing to talk to them. But ultimately the Republic is the one who oppressed them and there was genuine fear, stoked by Franco, that they'd shut down the mosques if they won. If the republicans do reach out with grand promises, is there any reason to think they'd intend to keep them and even if they did would the morrocans belive that? After all the morrocans aren't likely to win, just cauae a distraction that means the republicans do and then theyll have no leverage if the republic goes 'nah'.

Ultimately turning your enemies loyalest soldiers against them is a winning strategy but theres also reasons they are loyal. You probably would need someone like el Krim to signal that this was legit. Which is easier said than done given the Republic isnt holding him.

 

[Roger II]

So I was going to ask what the support-base for Franco in Morocco was(Hispanized elites, non-Hispanized elites, the Spanish version of pieds-noirs, etc) but I'm kind of now wondering what happens to Spain if they never get colonial possessions in Morocco in the first place.

 

[Gary Oswald]

I'm kind of now wondering what happens to Spain if they never get colonial possessions in Morocco in the first place.

I think it's as big a question as what happens to UK without Irish possessions. Certainly between no Army of Africa and no Disaster of Annual and thus the coup detat by Primo de Riva, early 20th century Spanish politics would be unrecognisable.

Though I'd happily bow to the opinions of our spanish experts on this.

 

[Gary Oswald]

So I was going to ask what the support-base for Franco in Morocco was(Hispanized elites, non-Hispanized elites, the Spanish version of pieds-noirs, etc).

I'm not remotely an expert, 20th century Europe is normally where I turn to @The Red while I retreat back to 19th century Africa, but essentially the Army of Africa was the Spanish Army to hold down the rebellious Moroccans. The colony was basically military rule, on paper it was a protectorate with a Moroccan ruler and a civilian spanish advisor, but in practice the army present was overwhelming in size, 30,000 strong, and called the shots. When the coup happened a bunch of officers were purged and shot and the men came over entirely to the Nationalist side, though there were attempts at strikes by the spanish settlers.

At that point Franco reached out to the Morrocan elites, largely recently conquered and very much non hispanized, to reassure them as he was aware his position relied on Morocco being quiet while he removed his army to Spain and they went along with it. He also began a mass recruiting campaign to get more Moroccan regulars into his existing forces. This group already existed, it was pretty standard askari colonial troops led by men like Mohamed Meziane who had remained loyal to Spain during the Rif rebellion and was a quite respected person among the Moroccans, he became their secretary of defense upon independence. It expanded so quickly because there was crop famine and widespread poverty. The army represented a steady wage that wasn't the hated labour in the mines in dreadful conditions. And well the Republic weren't their friends and a chance to invade Spain was not unappealing. Also like I said Franco made much of the 'atheist communists' being ready to turn on Islam and shut down the mosques.

And to an extent the Republicans played into this narrative, much was made of the Nationalist sending moors to rape and despoil spanish women in Republican propaganda and there's evidence of Moroccan soldiers being killed when taken prisoner at higher rates than white soldiers. There was genuine antipathy between the Republicans and the Moroccans for all people like Pierre Besnard said things like '‘We must not allow the workers of the Rif to be forced to kill their Spanish worker brothers".

George Padmore, the Trinidadian communist, who admittedly is not an unbiased source (he broke with the soviet union when they decided that Germany and Japan with no African colonies were worse than the UK and France with African colonies) wrote this article about it, which is worth reading. You can never describe Padmore as subtle or easily distracted from his main agenda but it's interesting to see his relatively uninformed point of view on it, and more importantly the common narrative he is hitting back against.

It's interesting to me because you see lots of people both in spain and without going, the Moroccans led a massive revolt against the Monarchy a few years back and the spanish left are fighting the reactionaries now, if the two can team up that's the war won, which is I think true. But there's so much bad blood that it would take something extraordinary to make it happen.

I think narratively, I'd almost be more interested in the Republic post Moroccan rebellion, trying to work out which ally they're going to lose out of France and the Moroccan rebels and the consequences of that choice.

 

[Gorro Rubio]

I'm not remotely an expert, 20th century Europe is normally where I turn to @The Red while I retreat back to 19th century Africa, but essentially the Army of Africa was the Spanish Army to hold down the rebellious Moroccans. The colony was basically military rule, on paper it was a protectorate with a Moroccan ruler and a civilian spanish advisor, but in practice the army present was overwhelming in size, 30,000 strong, and called the shots. When the coup happened a bunch of officers were purged and shot and the men came over entirely to the Nationalist side, though there were attempts at strikes by the spanish settlers.

At that point Franco reached out to the Morrocan elites, largely recently conquered and very much non hispanized, to reassure them as he was aware his position relied on Morocco being quiet while he removed his army to Spain and they went along with it. He also began a mass recruiting campaign to get more Moroccan regulars into his existing forces. This group already existed, it was pretty standard askari colonial troops led by men like Mohamed Meziane who had remained loyal to Spain during the Rif rebellion and was a quite respected person among the Moroccans, he became their secretary of defense upon independence. It expanded so quickly because there was crop famine and widespread poverty. The army represented a steady wage that wasn't the hated labour in the mines in dreadful conditions. And well the Republic weren't their friends and a chance to invade Spain was not unappealing. Also like I said Franco made much of the 'atheist communists' being ready to turn on Islam and shut down the mosques.

And to an extent the Republicans played into this narrative, much was made of the Nationalist sending moors to rape and despoil spanish women in Republican propaganda and there's evidence of Moroccan soldiers being killed when taken prisoner at higher rates than white soldiers. There was genuine antipathy between the Republicans and the Moroccans for all people like Pierre Besnard said things like '‘We must not allow the workers of the Rif to be forced to kill their Spanish worker brothers".

George Padmore, the Trinidadian communist, who admittedly is not an unbiased source (he broke with the soviet union when they decided that Germany and Japan with no African colonies were worse than the UK and France with African colonies) wrote this article about it, which is worth reading. You can never describe Padmore as subtle or easily distracted from his main agenda but it's interesting to see his relatively uninformed point of view on it, and more importantly the common narrative he is hitting back against.

It's interesting to me because you see lots of people both in spain and without going, the Moroccans led a massive revolt against the Monarchy a few years back and the spanish left are fighting the reactionaries now, if the two can team up that's the war won, which is I think true. But there's so much bad blood that it would take something extraordinary to make it happen.

I think narratively, I'd almost be more interested in the Republic post Moroccan rebellion, trying to work out which ally they're going to lose out of France and the Moroccan rebels and the consequences of that choice.

Just to add that a lot of the anti-Moroccan sentiment in current Spanish society dates back to the war (and not al-Andalus or whatever) and that Mezziane was a proper weasel that nonetheless provided some funny moments as Military Governor of Galicia when he had to hug an image of St James the Moorslayer (local patron saint) during the yearly religious festivities honouring the saint.

 

[Gorro Rubio]

And oh yeah, Spain without Moroccan colonies wouldn’t remotely resemble modern day Spain. You probably need a POD centuries in the past to avoid it, as it had been identified as an area of strategic importance since the reign of Ferdinand III of Castile in the 13th century.

My grandparents still remember the Moorish Guard with their fezes and chilabas guarding the gates of El Pardo in the 50s.