How could you ensure a successful USSR?

[Time Enough]

With any POD stretching back to 1953 how could you ensure a successful USSR? By successful I mean a country that is able to avoid the economic stagnation and corruption of the Late Soviet Union and doesn’t collapse under it’s own weight by 1991.

I wonder if Khrushchev being able to fulfil his economic liberalisation plans could work, though they would probably have to spend longer sorting them out since they were flawed.

 

[Time Enough]

Hmm, would Khrushchev stepping down in 1962 or similar allow him to be able to appoint a successor who would keep his reforms but be able to fight of Brezhnev? I know that Khrushchev's reforms were flawed but were probably the best attempt for the Soviet Union to pull up out of it's economic stagnation at any point in the 1950s/60s?

Maybe if he's replaced Alexei Kosygin in the early 60s, who seemed to have a better understanding of economics maybe that would help?

 

[neonduke]

I meant to reply to this earlier and I forgot. Khrushchev had the right idea in general but a lot of his ideas were deeply flawed, especially in regards to agriculture. This is discounting his secret speech, which while perhaps morally correct did a lot of damage to cohesion within the international communist movement.

Is there perhaps a better reformist candidate than Khrushchev once Stalin's gone? I'm not sure, the likelihood is we get a Stalinist. Your suggestion of Khrushchev stepping down earlier has legs, if he can face down the anti-party group before being felled by ill health perhaps?

Regardless just avoiding Brezhnev would be a positive step.

 

[Time Enough]

I meant to reply to this earlier and I forgot. Khrushchev had the right idea in general but a lot of his ideas were deeply flawed, especially in regards to agriculture. This is discounting his secret speech, which while perhaps morally correct did a lot of damage to cohesion within the international communist movement.

Indeed, I remember hearing that for the Soviet Union to be successful they had to sort out there agriculture. Khrushchev would have been better having less direct impact on it. As for the Secret Speech I think it could have gone fine and could have avoided hurting the International Communist Movement, if he hadn't followed it a few months later by invading Hungry and bulldozing Poland.

Is there perhaps a better reformist candidate than Khrushchev once Stalin's gone? I'm not sure, the likelihood is we get a Stalinist.

There's Beria, but even then it's hard to tell how much of his ideas were Reformism or hollow promises. An interesting idea could be if Anti-Party Group briefly succeed in 1957 only to implode (there a gaggle of Stalinists, I doubt they would be unable to lead for long) and be replaced by Zukhov and Kosygin. Probably be the best shot really.

Your suggestion of Khrushchev stepping down earlier has legs, if he can face down the anti-party group before being felled by ill health perhaps?

That too, generally any scenario that avoids the Anti-Party Group being able to have more power (they're incredibly weak in 1957, 1964 was different) or last long is the best bet. Less Conservative leadership.

Regardless just avoiding Brezhnev would be a positive step.

Indeed, I always think that if Brezhnev had a stroke in 1968 or something then the Soviet Union would probably be able to get a better leader in the long run.

 

[Makemakean]

Problem with the Soviet Union wasn't just the nature of the economic system, it's the fact that whole political system was just way too Byzantine with it being very unclear who really took orders from who, and where authority was ultimately vested, and such a system is insanely different to reform. I saw this interview with some Swedish fellow who used to work for the Swedish embassy over in Moscow, and he explains how some week or so after Gorbachev had made a big speech about big reforms in the agriculture sector, he was over at the Ministry for Agriculture, and he made some comment to an official there about the new reforms Gorbachev had called for. The official responded with something along the lines of, "Yeah, that's not going to happen..." which somewhat stunned the Swedish diplomat who couldn't help but ask further, only for the Russian to respond with "Why on Earth should I care about what the General Secretary of the Communist Party thinks? I don't work for him! I work for the Ministry of Agriculture, that's where I take my orders."

It is actually deeply ironic how the very reason Deng Xiaoping and company were able to carry out their very far-ranging reforms was because China had just come out of Cultural Revolution, and structurally speaking, the Cultural Revolution had had a very profound impact. It had solidified the supremacy of the Party Centre to the extent that there was no room for any haggling, much less for any ministry or government agencies or anything to try to ignore or obstruct any orders coming from the top. When the top brass had spoken, you followed the party line.

 

[Nyvis]

With any POD stretching back to 1953 how could you ensure a successful USSR? By successful I mean a country that is able to avoid the economic stagnation and corruption of the Late Soviet Union and doesn’t collapse under it’s own weight by 1991.

I wonder if Khrushchev being able to fulfil his economic liberalisation plans could work, though they would probably have to spend longer sorting them out since they were flawed.

Khrushchev had a lot of blind spots and dumb ideas from the top too. It suffers from the same issue as the Stalinist plan in that it relies from a central head which is often disconnected from realities on the bottom. I think you need political opening to go better to succeed here, so that feedback can travel up rather than just have dictats downward.

That taken into account, I think the divergence you need is not rolling tanks into Hungary, ideally without losing it entirely. That or Czechoslovakia.

This enables both a friendlier Europe by making communist parties more likely to be welcomed into coalitions with the rest of the left (no third force France would be huge), which alleviates the foreign policy issues of the soviet union, while also setting the tone for moderate shifts in political control.

Problem with the Soviet Union wasn't just the nature of the economic system, it's the fact that whole political system was just way too Byzantine with it being very unclear who really took orders from who, and where authority was ultimately vested, and such a system is insanely different to reform. I saw this interview with some Swedish fellow who used to work for the Swedish embassy over in Moscow, and he explains how some week or so after Gorbachev had made a big speech about big reforms in the agriculture sector, he was over at the Ministry for Agriculture, and he made some comment to an official there about the new reforms Gorbachev had called for. The official responded with something along the lines of, "Yeah, that's not going to happen..." which somewhat stunned the Swedish diplomat who couldn't help but ask further, only for the Russian to respond with "Why on Earth should I care about what the General Secretary of the Communist Party thinks? I don't work for him! I work for the Ministry of Agriculture, that's where I take my orders."

It is actually deeply ironic how the very reason Deng Xiaoping and company were able to carry out their very far-ranging reforms was because China had just come out of Cultural Revolution, and structurally speaking, the Cultural Revolution had had a very profound impact. It had solidified the supremacy of the Party Centre to the extent that there was no room for any haggling, much less for any ministry or government agencies or anything to try to ignore or obstruct any orders coming from the top. When the top brass had spoken, you followed the party line.

Yep, it was a mess of politics more than a mess of economics. Which in turn meant no one got feedback from the bottom or economic nor could reforms go through smoothly when issues were finally identified.

 

[Makemakean]

As for the Secret Speech I think it could have gone fine and could have avoided hurting the International Communist Movement, if he hadn't followed it a few months later by invading Hungry and bulldozing Poland.

The problem isn't really the impact on the international Communist movement, the problem was its impact internally in the Soviet Union. That's why it was a secret speech in the first place, people didn't want the public really to know. It deeply undermines the legitimacy of the Communist Party's hold on power if they themselves admit to that for most of the time they have been in power, they have been led by a tyrant who is to be deplored and denounced. All the sacrifices that had been made by the Soviet people during Stalin's long years in the General Secretary's office, all the hardships... now all of a sudden they had been entirely in vain.

 

[Time Enough]

So to break thing down a bit, an avoidance of the Secret Speech and Centralising Power could be better for the Soviet Union in the long run? That's interesting.

That taken into account, I think the divergence you need is not rolling tanks into Hungary, ideally without losing it entirely. That or Czechoslovakia.

This enables both a friendlier Europe by making communist parties more likely to be welcomed into coalitions with the rest of the left (no third force France would be huge), which alleviates the foreign policy issues of the soviet union, while also setting the tone for moderate shifts in political control.

Given how that with Hungry intervention only seemed to have happened because it seems to be a combo of the Soviet Union wanting to intervene if Hungry seemed to plan to leave the Warsaw Pact and also a riot against the Hungarian Secret Police that seemed to change Khrushchev's mind, so if Hungry seemed to say they will continue with the Pact and there's no riot it could allow for the Hungarian reformists to stay in charge and also allow the Soviet Union to avoid rolling tanks in.

If Poland is allowed to reform during the same period, then maybe it allows the Soviet Union to last longer?

 

[Makemakean]

If I am to offer my two cents, you just cannot have a chance in leader due to a palace coup or something of the sort, because the infrastructure and everything will be just the same as before, and it will just not allow for any kind of meaningful reform. Instead of seeing stagnation and decline under a corrupt drunk in Brezhnev, you're just going to see stagnation and decline under someone else. You need something decisive to properly establish the supremacy of the party centre.

So here's how I would go about doing it.

The Secret Speech is given in February 1956. Zhukov was forced to retire in October 1957. Well, pretty soon after his forced retirement, the man stages a proper military coup, drawing on the loyalty of the Red Army and his personal popularity.

Tanks in the street, soldiers with guns in their hands marching on the Red Square. Show trials for Khrushchev and the rest, but, and this is important, unlike Stalin, Zhukov does not decide to actually execute anyone. Khrushchev and all are sent off in internal political exile, the rest of their lives under house arrest.

Moving quickly, Zhukov can then make the necessary systemic changes to establish the supremacy of the party center. His policy is thereafter deliberately ambiguous, inviting people to see in him what they want to see. He can restore the legitimacy of Stalin's reign in the same way as Deng maintained the legitimacy of Mao and refused to denounce him. Sure, mistakes were made during Stalin's time in power, but that was inevitable in a revolutionary society undergoing rapid change. Stalin was still a hero, yada-yada-yada. When dealing with foreign powers, he can seek to put the blame on Khrushchev and company for the invasion of Hungary.

He can keep those policies of Khrushchev that he likes, while jettisoning others.

 

[Death's Companion]

If I am to offer my two cents, you just cannot have a chance in leader due to a palace coup or something of the sort, because the infrastructure and everything will be just the same as before, and it will just not allow for any kind of meaningful reform. Instead of seeing stagnation and decline under a corrupt drunk in Brezhnev, you're just going to see stagnation and decline under someone else. You need something decisive to properly establish the supremacy of the party centre.

So here's how I would go about doing it.

The Secret Speech is given in February 1956. Zhukov was forced to retire in October 1957. Well, pretty soon after his forced retirement, the man stages a proper military coup, drawing on the loyalty of the Red Army and his personal popularity.

Tanks in the street, soldiers with guns in their hands marching on the Red Square. Show trials for Khrushchev and the rest, but, and this is important, unlike Stalin, Zhukov does not decide to actually execute anyone. Khrushchev and all are sent off in internal political exile, the rest of their lives under house arrest.

Moving quickly, Zhukov can then make the necessary systemic changes to establish the supremacy of the party center. His policy is thereafter deliberately ambiguous, inviting people to see in him what they want to see. He can restore the legitimacy of Stalin's reign in the same way as Deng maintained the legitimacy of Mao and refused to denounce him. Sure, mistakes were made during Stalin's time in power, but that was inevitable in a revolutionary society undergoing rapid change. Stalin was still a hero, yada-yada-yada. When dealing with foreign powers, he can seek to put the blame on Khrushchev and company for the invasion of Hungary.

He can keep those policies of Khrushchev that he likes, while jettisoning others.

The Red Army was not the institution to launch a coup.

 

[Nyvis]

Given how that with Hungry intervention only seemed to have happened because it seems to be a combo of the Soviet Union wanting to intervene if Hungry seemed to plan to leave the Warsaw Pact and also a riot against the Hungarian Secret Police that seemed to change Khrushchev's mind, so if Hungry seemed to say they will continue with the Pact and there's no riot it could allow for the Hungarian reformists to stay in charge and also allow the Soviet Union to avoid rolling tanks in.

If Poland is allowed to reform during the same period, then maybe it allows the Soviet Union to last longer?

Yeah, the Warsaw Pact states accepting "you can reform a bit as long as you're clearly not leaving" as the party line, that'd be extremely helpful. All it could take is the reformists making the right noises at the right time. Even if the cost is a neutral Hungary, I'm not sure all reformists in the Warsaw Pact will want to leave either. Neutral pink Hungary as a show of good faith while quietly ensuring Poland stays in would reassure a lot of the western left and open paths to reformism without really losing much. Potentially this prompts a hardliner coup attempt and surviving and purging it can help clean up opposition to political reform.

If I am to offer my two cents, you just cannot have a chance in leader due to a palace coup or something of the sort, because the infrastructure and everything will be just the same as before, and it will just not allow for any kind of meaningful reform. Instead of seeing stagnation and decline under a corrupt drunk in Brezhnev, you're just going to see stagnation and decline under someone else. You need something decisive to properly establish the supremacy of the party centre.

So here's how I would go about doing it.

The Secret Speech is given in February 1956. Zhukov was forced to retire in October 1957. Well, pretty soon after his forced retirement, the man stages a proper military coup, drawing on the loyalty of the Red Army and his personal popularity.

Tanks in the street, soldiers with guns in their hands marching on the Red Square. Show trials for Khrushchev and the rest, but, and this is important, unlike Stalin, Zhukov does not decide to actually execute anyone. Khrushchev and all are sent off in internal political exile, the rest of their lives under house arrest.

Moving quickly, Zhukov can then make the necessary systemic changes to establish the supremacy of the party center. His policy is thereafter deliberately ambiguous, inviting people to see in him what they want to see. He can restore the legitimacy of Stalin's reign in the same way as Deng maintained the legitimacy of Mao and refused to denounce him. Sure, mistakes were made during Stalin's time in power, but that was inevitable in a revolutionary society undergoing rapid change. Stalin was still a hero, yada-yada-yada. When dealing with foreign powers, he can seek to put the blame on Khrushchev and company for the invasion of Hungary.

He can keep those policies of Khrushchev that he likes, while jettisoning others.

That's just plain not happening. The red army was incredibly loyal. The worries about bonapartism were entirely people being way too into historical parallelism.

 

[Makemakean]

That's just plain not happening. The red army was incredibly loyal. The worries about bonapartism were entirely people being way too into historical parallelism.

Then I'd say we really have a problem, because the kind of structural reforms to the bureaucracy and political system are other things I would rank among plain not happening, and they are, I would posit, absolutely necessary for the Soviet Union to survive. A military coup is the best bet I could think of for how to allow for a thorough top-to-bottom restructuring, and if that's impossible, well, I can't really think of anything else.

 

[Nyvis]

Then I'd say we really have a problem, because the kind of structural reforms to the bureaucracy and political system are other things I would rank among plain not happening, and they are necessary for the Soviet Union to survive. A military coup is the best bet I could think of for how to allow for a thorough top-to-bottom restructuring, and if that's impossible, well, I can't really think of anything else.

A significant chunk of the bureaucracy taking the wrong side in a factional struggle maybe?

 

[Makemakean]

A significant chunk of the bureaucracy taking the wrong side in a factional struggle maybe?

Pray elaborate.

 

[Nyvis]

Pray elaborate.

If one of Khrushchev (or someone else's) reforms angers a chunk of the bureaucracy, they'll probably back a party coup. But it won't necessarily succeed if the reformist side has prepared themselves for it. And with a bunch of the conservatives in disrespute, they can double down on deeper reforms and streamlining, maybe?

 

[Creekmench]

Here's an idea for it, Suslov succeeds Stalin and runs the show for the same amount of time as Nikita Khrushchev, his more Orthodox views on Stalin leads to more purges re-establishing the primacy of the Party Center, and whoever comes after well gets the room and ability to launch more radical reforms without the other branches ignoring them. Hell, this could delay the Sino-Soviet split as we know it what with no peaceful co-existance and de-stalinizing. Granted this may be a long shot, since Suslov was power shy, and probably was not prominent enough for it, but this could work as a Cultural Revolution analog paving the way for a Soviet Deng?

 

[Makemakean]

If one of Khrushchev (or someone else's) reforms angers a chunk of the bureaucracy, they'll probably back a party coup. But it won't necessarily succeed if the reformist side has prepared themselves for it. And with a bunch of the conservatives in disrespute, they can double down on deeper reforms and streamlining, maybe?

It seems to me quite clear that if enough of the bureaucracy is onboard with the coup so that when the coup fails, it not just warrants a serious structural reform of the whole system, but so that it's even politically possible to do it, then the coup simply will not fail.

 

[Nyvis]

It seems to me quite clear that if enough of the bureaucracy is onboard with the coup so that when the coup fails, it not just warrants a serious structural reform of the whole system, but so that it's even politically possible to do it, then the coup simply will not fail.

Might be where you can inject in the army? Or at least Zhukov? The army isn't going to coup a clear party leader, but it might come to one side or another if it's more disputed.

 

[Makemakean]

Might be where you can inject in the army? Or at least Zhukov? The army isn't going to coup a clear party leader, but it might come to one side or another if it's more disputed.

I'd say you definitely need the army, because without a strong external force pushing through, in any pure struggle between the Party Centre and the Bureaucracy, the Bureaucracy is going to persevere.

 

[Nyvis]

I'd say you definitely need the army, because without a strong external force pushing through, in any pure struggle between the Party Centre and the Bureaucracy, the Bureaucracy is going to persevere.

Then you need the party center to pull in the military because it won't step in on its own.

One possibility could be Zhukov resigning its military position to seek a political position, then when he's in trouble with the bureaucracy, the sympathetic army might consider supporting him? But I'm not sure he really wanted the job, nor would be interested in setting a precedent of military men in charge. That was one of the party's large (unfounded) fears.