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Going Over The Top: A Delayed Start

This is something I looked into in detail when I was writing the “Utopia” vignette from several months back, where my starting premise was “no world wars at all”; how does the tension get relieved, without it becoming World War I and, eventually, World War II?

In the end, it turned out being a more contained, much delayed war that they in the timeline clearly think was essentially World War I, and only an observer from our timeline would think they got off lucky. Perhaps a more creative thinker could have come up with something else.
 
The other point worthy of consideration in a "delayed" scenario is that, even with a delay of only a couple of years, the relative power balance of the two alliance blocs is potentially significantly altered. The quite finely balanced setup referenced in the first part of this series - that allows both for either side to "win" a conflict, and for the war to drag on over several years of stalemate - might no longer exist by 1916,1917,1918...

A short more contained and overall less destructive war, not drawing in all of OTL's Great Power participants who joined later (Italy, Turkey, USA), probably wouldn't have the cultural impact of being recognised as a Great War, a "war to end all wars" etc.

Most prominent in my mind here is Russia, who might be in a much better starting position as a result of a delay, if ongoing industrialisation, military modernisation, and fiscal reform programmes can be completed from 1914-191?, and without all the plates coming crashing down in the meantime. There might be no miracle at Tannenburg ITTL.

It may be a myth, but I've always been led to believe that the German military mindset during this period was one of "better now than later", in relation to an eventually inevitable confrontation with Russia.
 
It may be a myth, but I've always been led to believe that the German military mindset during this period was one of "better now than later", in relation to an eventually inevitable confrontation with Russia.

I seem to recall staff notes from 1912 that basically took this view.
 
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